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Abstract
A flurry of fuzzing tools (fuzzers) have been proposed in
the literature, aiming at detecting software vulnerabilities
effectively and efficiently. To date, it is however still chal-
lenging to compare fuzzers due to the inconsistency of the
benchmarks, performance metrics, and/or environments for
evaluation, which buries the useful insights and thus impedes
the discovery of promising fuzzing primitives. In this pa-
per, we design and develop UNIFUZZ, an open-source and
metrics-driven platform for assessing fuzzers in a compre-
hensive and quantitative manner. Specifically, UNIFUZZ to
date has incorporated 35 usable fuzzers, a benchmark of 20
real-world programs, and six categories of performance met-
rics. We first systematically study the usability of existing
fuzzers, find and fix a number of flaws, and integrate them
into UNIFUZZ. Based on the study, we propose a collection of
pragmatic performance metrics to evaluate fuzzers from six
complementary perspectives. Using UNIFUZZ, we conduct
in-depth evaluations of several prominent fuzzers including
AFL [1], AFLFast [2], Angora [3], Honggfuzz [4], MOPT [5],
QSYM [6], T-Fuzz [7] and VUzzer64 [8]. We find that none
of them outperforms the others across all the target programs,
and that using a single metric to assess the performance of
a fuzzer may lead to unilateral conclusions, which demon-
strates the significance of comprehensive metrics. Moreover,
we identify and investigate previously overlooked factors that
may significantly affect a fuzzer’s performance, including
instrumentation methods and crash analysis tools. Our empir-
ical results show that they are critical to the evaluation of a
fuzzer. We hope that our findings can shed light on reliable
fuzzing evaluation, so that we can discover promising fuzzing
primitives to effectively facilitate fuzzer designs in the future.
Yuwei Li and Shouling Ji are the co-first authors. Shouling Ji and Chun-
ming Wu are the co-corresponding authors.
1 Introduction
Fuzzing is a software-testing technique that detects vulnera-
bilities by executing target programs with a large amount of
abnormal or random test cases. In recent years, a plethora
of fuzzing related works have emerged in both industry
and academia. In industry, major software vendors such as
Google [9] and Microsoft [10] leverage fuzzing techniques
to help detect bugs in their products. On the other hand,
GitHub [11] hosts more than 2,000 fuzzing related reposi-
tories. In academia, over 200 fuzzing related research papers
have been published since 2010, according to DBLP [12].
Despite the rapid development of fuzzing techniques, there
are several open questions that need to be addressed. (1) How
do these fuzzers perform in practice? (2) How to compare
different fuzzers under a fair and comprehensive set of perfor-
mance metrics? (3) Which fuzzing primitives or techniques
are promising and should be promoted? However, previous
works fail to answer these questions for the following reasons.
First, many existing works do not conduct appropriate and
sufficient experiments to provide trustworthy results. For in-
stance, it is common to see that insufficient repetitions in the
experiments make the results random and unreliable [13]. In
addition, many fuzzing works, when comparing their methods
with others, directly use previously reported results without
re-running the experiments [7, 14], which is unfair as their
experimental environments (e.g., CPU, memory) are different.
Second, the evaluations of existing fuzzers are often biased
due to the lack of uniform benchmarks. The choices of target
programs in different fuzzing papers vary widely. Therefore,
it is possible that the proposed fuzzers have preference over
the selected programs. Third, the existing metrics are not
suitable nor comprehensive for evaluating fuzzers. It is in-
appropriate to only utilize the number of unique crashes to
represent a fuzzer’s capability of finding bugs, as there is of-
ten a huge discrepancy between the number of unique crashes
and the number of unique bugs [13]. In addition, most existing
fuzzing works do not evaluate the consumption of computing
resources of the fuzzers. Therefore, there is an urgent need
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to conduct comprehensive and pragmatic evaluations for the
state-of-the-art fuzzers on a uniform platform.
Conducting comprehensive and pragmatic evaluations of
fuzzers entails overcoming multiple important challenges.
First, although many fuzzers have been open sourced, their
usability in practice is often limited, as reported by recent
research [7, 15], which results in reproducibility issues, im-
peding comparison. Thus, it is necessary to test and enhance
fuzzers’ usability. Second, the evaluation of fuzzers should
be conducted on pragmatic benchmark programs. Existing
benchmark programs are not satisfactory [13]. A reliable eval-
uation of fuzzers thus calls for pragmatic benchmarks. Third,
the assessment must be conducted based on a comprehensive
set of performance metrics. Nevertheless, existing metrics
are insufficient and rough, leading to incomplete assessments.
Thus, it is important to augment the performance metrics for
comprehensive evaluation.
To address the above challenges, we design and imple-
ment UNIFUZZ [16], an open-source, holistic and pragmatic
metrics-driven platform for evaluating fuzzers. In summary,
we make the following main contributions.
1) An Open-source and Pragmatic Metrics-driven Plat-
form. We design and implement UNIFUZZ, the first open-
source platform for evaluating fuzzers in a comprehensive
and quantitative manner, which to date has incorporated 35
popular fuzzers, a benchmark suite of 20 real-world programs,
and six categories of performance metrics. For each of the
35 fuzzers, we test its usability and provide a Dockerfile for
easy installation and deployment. In addition, we find and fix
(partially) more than 15 flaws, which have been reported to
their developers. For the 20 real-world benchmark programs,
UNIFUZZ provides all necessary side information such as
software installation and command arguments to ensure their
usability. Furthermore, we implement tools in UNIFUZZ to
facilitate the crash analysis process including triaging crashes
into bugs, matching with the corresponding CVEs, and ana-
lyzing the severity of the bugs, etc. Specifically, we develop a
CVE keywords database that includes the CVEs for the UNI-
FUZZ benchmark programs, which can significantly reduce
the human efforts in CVE matching. We also propose a col-
lection of performance metrics in six categories: quantity of
unique bugs, quality of bugs, speed of finding bugs, stability
of finding bugs, coverage and overhead, which can be used to
assess a fuzzer’s performance comprehensively.
2) Extensive Evaluations of Fuzzers. Leveraging UNI-
FUZZ, we conduct extensive experiments to compare eight
prominent coverage-based fuzzers. The experimental results
show that no fuzzer outperforms the others on all the tested
benchmark programs, which are very different from the con-
clusions in their papers. This observation reveals that sub-
jectivity and bias may exist in the evaluations of previous
fuzzing works. Moreover, the experimental results reflect that
using a single metric to evaluate fuzzers may lead to unilat-
eral conclusions, which demonstrates the importance of using
comprehensive metrics to evaluate the fuzzers.
3) New Findings and Insights for Future Fuzzing. From
the evaluations, we gain important insights and findings for
future fuzzing research. For example, we find previously un-
accounted factors that can significantly affect the performance
of fuzzers, e.g., instrumentation methods and crash analysis
tools. The results demonstrate that even small changes of
these factors can have a significant impact on the assessment
of fuzzers. Therefore, fuzzing experiments should be con-
ducted in a more rigorous and precise way to provide more
reliable results.
2 Motivation of UNIFUZZ
To assess the performance of existing fuzzers and to enlighten
the design of new ones, it is crucial to conduct in-depth com-
parative studies of different fuzzers. Unfortunately, there are
many challenges for conducting such comprehensive evalu-
ations on fuzzers as follows, which motivate the design of
UNIFUZZ.
Usability Issues of Existing Fuzzers. Whether the exist-
ing implementation of fuzzers works in practice is often ques-
tionable. First, some fuzzers may be difficult or complicated
to be used directly. For instance, Zhu et al. [15] stated that
they could not appropriately run Driller [17], T-Fuzz [7] and
VUzzer [8]. Second, we find that there are numerous flaws
(e.g., incorrect judgment on crash, abnormal behaviors dur-
ing the fuzzing process) with the implementation of many
fuzzers, which may cause negative impacts on their perfor-
mance. Therefore, it is necessary to test the usability of exist-
ing fuzzers and call for more community efforts to enhance
fuzzers’ usability in practice. We provide the detailed analy-
sis of the flaws of several popular fuzzers on the UNIFUZZ
open-source platform [16] due to space limitation.
Lack of Pragmatic Real-World Benchmark Programs.
Benchmark programs are fundamental for evaluating the per-
formance of fuzzers, which should be carefully designed such
that a fuzzer can be evaluated in a fair manner. Thus, good
benchmark programs should have the following characteris-
tics. First, they should have similar features as the real-world
programs, and these features include coding styles, sizes and
vulnerabilities. In this way, a fuzzer’s performance on these
benchmark programs can be more indicative. Second, to pro-
vide comprehensive evaluations, benchmark programs should
exhibit a diversity of functionalities, sizes, vulnerability types,
etc. Third, from the perspective of conducting practical as-
sessments on fuzzers’ capabilities in discovering bugs, each
benchmark program should contain at least one vulnerability
that can be found within a reasonable amount of time, which
implies two important properties of a pragmatic benchmark.
(1) The program should contain at least one bug. Otherwise, it
cannot effectively distinguish the capabilities of fuzzers in dis-
covering bugs. (2) The difficulty in discovering a bug should
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be reasonable1. Otherwise, it may cause unaffordable evalua-
tion overhead. For instance, a one-month fuzzing experiment
for a single fuzzer on a single program with 30 repetitions
requires 21,600 CPU hours, let alone conducting a reliable
and comprehensive evaluation with multiple benchmark pro-
grams and seed sets [13]. Fourth, the benchmark programs
should be easy to use. To this end, the developers should
provide rich information of a benchmark program such as
installation methods, command arguments, input types. More-
over, it would be better if the developers of the benchmarks
can provide methods/tools for automatically analyzing the
corresponding crash samples of benchmark programs.
Existing fuzzing benchmark programs can be grouped into
two categories: synthetic programs and real-world programs.
Typical examples of synthetic benchmarks include LAVA-
M [18] and DARPA CGC [19]. Typical examples of real-
world programs are exiv2, mp3gain, etc., which are Linux
open-source programs with several vulnerabilities. However,
existing benchmark programs, both synthetic and real-world
are not satisfactory [13].
The existing synthetic benchmarks usually are small in size,
and the artificial bugs are designed and injected following
some relatively simple mechanisms. Thus, the developer of
a fuzzer may improve its performance by understanding the
bug-injecting patterns and the mechanisms, and the evaluation
results can be biased. As a result, fuzzers that have good
performance on these synthetic benchmark programs may not
work well on the real-world programs.
The existing real-world benchmark programs are not sat-
isfactory as well due to the following issues. First, we still
lack standard and sufficient real-world benchmark programs,
and existing fuzzers are usually evaluated on self-chosen pro-
grams, which may cause evaluation bias. Second, the real-
world programs are not as convenient as the synthetic pro-
grams on validating bugs due to the lack of clear indicators
of bug triggering. For example, existing works usually triage
crashes and filter vulnerabilities by leveraging different tools
such as AddressSanitizer (ASan) [20] and GDB [21]. How-
ever, due to their own limitations and inconsistency between
different tools, these different crash triage methods may cause
bias as well. Moreover, many papers either state that they val-
idate the corresponding CVEs manually [2, 22, 23] or do not
mention how they validate the CVEs. Nevertheless, the man-
ual validation process is time-consuming and tedious, which
may also cause bias and mistakes. All the issues call for the
development of a suite of diverse and pragmatic benchmarks
as well as automatic tools to analyze crashes.
Lack of Proper and Comprehensive Performance Met-
rics. Most previous works usually evaluate fuzzers using the
three de facto metrics: the number of unique crashes, the
number of unique bugs, and the coverage. However, these
metrics alone often fail to fully account for a fuzzer’s perfor-
1Note that the difficulty is relative to the state-of-the-art fuzzers. With the develop-
ment of the fuzzers, the new benchmarks with higher difficulty need to be proposed.
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Figure 1: Overview of UNIFUZZ.
mance. For instance, solely relying on the number of unique
crashes [2, 8, 24] may lead to misleading conclusions, as
more unique crashes do not definitely represent more unique
bugs [13]. Further, in addition to the number of unique bugs,
the quality of bugs is also an important metric that needs to be
taken into consideration. For example, when two fuzzers find
a similar number of bugs in the same time, it is inappropriate
to draw the conclusion that the two fuzzers have similar per-
formance, if the bugs found by one fuzzer are rarer or more
dangerous. Finally, overhead is also an important metric. The
number of bugs found by fuzzer A may be twice as many as
those found by fuzzer B, but it might be improper to consider
fuzzer A performs better when it costs hundreds of times of
computing resources than fuzzer B. Therefore, we need to
enhance the metrics, so that they complement each other and
provide comprehensive and reliable evaluations for fuzzers.
3 Design of UNIFUZZ
To address the challenges discussed in Section 2, we design
and implement UNIFUZZ, an open-source platform for eval-
uating fuzzers. Figure 1 presents an overview of UNIFUZZ,
which mainly consists of three components: usable fuzzers,
pragmatic benchmarks, and performance metrics.
3.1 Usable Fuzzers
UNIFUZZ to date has incorporated 35 usable fuzzers in-
cluding AFL [1], AFLFast [2], AFLGo [25], AFLPIN [26],
AFLSmart [27], Angora [3], CodeAlchemist [28], Driller [17],
Domato [29], Dharma [30], Eclipser [31], FairFuzz [32],
Fuzzilli [33], Grammarinator [34], Honggfuzz [4], Jsfuzz [35],
jsfunfuzz [36], LearnAFL [37], MoonLight [38], MOPT [5],
NAUTILUS [39], NEUZZ [40], NEZHA [41], Orthrus [42],
Peach [43], PTfuzz [44], QSYM [6], QuickFuzz [45],
radamsa [46], slowfuzz [47], Superion [48], T-Fuzz [7],
VUzzer [8], VUzzer64 [8] and zzuf [49]. The types of incorpo-
3
rated fuzzers are diverse, including grammar-based, mutation-
based, directed and coverage-based fuzzers. Table 1 presents
the detailed information of the usable fuzzers incorporated
in UNIFUZZ. In order to test the usability of these fuzzers,
we manually build and test each of these fuzzers. During this
process, we find many design and implementation flaws in
these fuzzers. Up to date, we have found more than 15 serious
flaws among these fuzzers and reported them to the develop-
ers. With our help, some of these flaws have been promptly
fixed and released. A more detailed description of these issues
is presented in the UNIFUZZ open-source platform [16]. For
each fuzzer in Table 1, we also implement a Dockerfile for
installing and using it conveniently in a Docker container. We
choose to conduct fuzzing experiments in a Docker container
for the following reasons. First, compared with conducting
fuzzing on a physical machine, Docker is more convenient
for resource allocation and isolation, which can provide fair
fuzzing evaluations. Second, compared with virtual machines,
Docker is lighter-weight and costs less computing resources.
Thus, with limited resources, users are able to conduct more
fuzzing experiments simultaneously when using Docker. In
addition, Docker can be operated and managed more conve-
niently. In addition to testing the usability of these fuzzers
and making them available, we conduct comprehensive evalu-
ations on eight prominent coverage-based fuzzers, with the
details presented in Section 4.
3.2 Pragmatic Benchmarks
According to Section 2, pragmatic benchmark programs
should have the following properties: (1) similar to the real-
world programs, including coding styles, sizes, and vulner-
abilities, etc. (2) comprehensive, which are various in terms
of functionalities, sizes, and vulnerability types, etc. (3) prac-
tical, which means at least one bug should be found in a
reasonable amount of time. (4) conveniently to be used, which
means the users can easily use the benchmark programs and
get the evaluation results. Following the above principles, we
construct a pragmatic benchmark suite that consists of 20
real-world programs for evaluating fuzzers as shown in Table
2. Specifically, UNIFUZZ provides detailed and comprehen-
sive information of each program including the version, size,
installation information, input type and command arguments,
etc., to ensure the usability. For each program, UNIFUZZ
provides its source code and a Dockerfile for installing and
using it. Furthermore, UNIFUZZ provides effective tools to
analyze the corresponding crash samples of a target program
conveniently. The analyses include but are not limited to: (1)
de-duplicating and triaging the crash samples into bugs; (2)
matching the crash samples into the corresponding CVEs and
(3) analyzing the severity of the bugs triggered by the crash
samples. It is worth noting that we do not modify the bench-
mark programs. As a result, the raw features of the real-world
programs are preserved. Instead, we focus on how to select
Table 1: The fuzzers incorporated in UNIFUZZ.
Fuzzer Mutation/Generation Directed/Coverage Target
AFL [1] M C S/B 1
AFLFast [2] M C S/B
AFLGo [25] M D S
AFLPIN [26] M C B
AFLSmart [27] M C S/B
Angora [3] M C S/B
CodeAlchemist [28] G n.a. B
Driller [17] M C B
Domato [29] G n.a. B
Dharma [30] G n.a. B
Eclipser [31] M C S
FairFuzz [32] M C S
Fuzzilli [33] M C S
Grammarinator [34] G n.a. B
Honggfuzz [4] M C S
Jsfuzz [35] M C S
jsfunfuzz [36] G n.a. B
LearnAFL [37] M C S
MoonLight [38] n.a. n.a. n.a.
MOPT [5] M C S/B
NAUTILUS [39] G+M C S
NEUZZ [40] M C S
NEZHA [41] M C L 2
Orthrus [42] n.a. n.a. n.a.
Peach [43] G n.a. B
PTfuzz [44] M C S
QSYM [6] M C B
QuickFuzz [45] G+M n.a. B
radamsa [46] M C B
slowfuzz [47] M n.a. L
Superion [48] G+M C S
T-Fuzz [7] M C S
VUzzer [8] M C B
VUzzer64 [8] M C B
zzuf [49] M n.a. B
1 S: source code, B: binary.
2 L: user needs to write libFuzzer code.
these programs and developing tools for analyzing the experi-
mental results conveniently. Next, we describe the details of
program selection and the crash analysis methods.
Programs Selection. In order to select suitable programs,
we investigate fuzzing-related papers published on top con-
ferences in information security and software engineering
fields to find the real-world programs and the correspond-
ing versions used in their evaluations2. Based on the above
process, we finally select 20 real-world programs as shown
in Table 2. The selected programs cover six functionality
types including: image, audio, video, text, binary and network
packet processing software. In addition, they cover various
types of vulnerabilities including: heap buffer overflow, stack
overflow, segmentation fault, excessive memory allocation,
global buffer overflow, stack buffer overflow, memory leak,
free error, float point exception, alloc-dealloc mismatch, mem-
cpy parameter overlap, use-after-free, etc. Therefore, these
programs are able to provide a comprehensive evaluation on
the performance of fuzzers.
Triaging Crashes into Unique Bugs. Generally, there are
two main approaches for triaging crashes into unique bugs:
2If a program is selected with multiple versions, we prefer to choose the one which
has more vulnerabilities.
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Table 2: The real-world programs of the UNIFUZZ benchmark.
@@ represents the input file.
Type Program Version Arguments
Image
exiv2 0.26 @@
gdk-pixbuf-pixdata (gdk) gdk-pixbuf 2.31.1 @@ /dev/null
imginfo jasper 2.0.12 -f @@
jhead 3.00 @@
tiffsplit libtiff 3.9.7 @@
Audio
lame lame 3.99.5 @@ /dev/null
mp3gain 1.5.2-r2 @@
wav2swf swftools 0.9.2 -o /dev/null @@
Video
ffmpeg 4.0.1
(-y -i @@ -c:v \
mpeg4 -c:a copy -f \
mp4 /dev/null)
flvmeta 1.2.1 @@
mp42aac Bento4 1.5.1-628 @@ /dev/null
Text
cflow 1.6 @@
infotocap ncurses 6.1 -o /dev/null @@
jq 1.5 . @@
mujs 1.0.2 @@
pdftotext xpdf 4.00 @@ /dev/null
sqlite3 3.8.9 (stdin)
Binary
nm binutils 5279478
(-A -a -l -S -s \
- -special-syms \
- -synthetic \
- -with-symbol-versions \
-D @@)
objdump binutils 2.28 -S @@
Network tcpdump 4.8.1 + libpcap 1.8.1 -e -vv -nr @@
one is based on analyzing the root cause of the bugs, and the
other is based on analyzing the output results. One common
implementation of the first approach is to patch the program
for each vulnerability based on the analysis of the root cause
of the vulnerability [13]. If crash file a and crash file b both
trigger the bug of the target program, but neither does that
on the bug-fixed one, they will be regarded as the same bug.
Although this approach seems to be able to provide accu-
rate ground truth information of the benchmark programs,
the root cause analysis is hard [50, 51] and there are many
challenges in implementing this approach in practice. (1) To
provide all-side ground truth information of bugs in the pro-
gram, it is required to access all the patched versions of the
target program. (2) Each patched version should only fix one
unique bug without overlap. Otherwise, it may cause huge
false positives/negatives.
The second approach is usually implemented by analyzing
the output information when bugs are triggered. Compared
to the first approach, the second approach is more practical
in implementation which can provide relatively fair evalu-
ation results. For instance, one commonly used method is
leveraging tools such as ASan [20] to produce the stack trace
information when a bug of the program is triggered, then
the stack hash method [52] can be used to extract N stack
frames to de-duplicate the bugs. This approach may also
cause false positives/negatives when choosing different val-
ues of N. Nevertheless, how to select the value of N to provide
results with the lowest false positives/negatives is a difficult
research problem which has not been completely solved and
is out-of-scope of this paper. As a trade-off and guided by
the previous work [13, 52], we select N as 3. In addition, as
different tools use various methods to detect bugs, relying on
a single tool may neglect certain types of bugs. Therefore,
to have a more precise detection result, we prioritize the out-
put report produced by ASan [20] and use the output reports
produced by other tools such as GDB [21] as a supplement3.
Matching CVEs. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE) [53] provides information of existing vulnerabilities.
Most existing fuzzing works evaluate their fuzzers’ capability
in finding bugs by leveraging CVE information [2,7,24]. Thus,
it is important to figure out what and how many known/new
CVEs (CVE vulnerabilities) are discovered by a fuzzer. How-
ever, matching crash samples with the corresponding CVEs is
time-consuming and tedious for the following reasons. First,
the description of each CVE is written in natural language
without a well-defined structure. Thus, it is difficult to extract
the key information (e.g., vulnerable function names) from
the description directly. Second, although the references of
each CVE may provide additional information such as the
PoC (Proof-of-the-Concept) file that triggers a CVE and the
output report generated by crash analysis tools, such infor-
mation is usually incomplete or missing [54], which makes
CVE matching even harder. Moreover, the references are also
unstructured. Thus, human efforts are needed to figure out
what content a reference link represents (e.g., the download
link of a PoC file or the bug reports). Third, as different tools
may be leveraged to obtain the output report, it is difficult to
match with different output reports directly.
In order to reduce the human efforts in matching CVEs,
we construct a CVE keywords database that includes the key
information of the CVEs related to the UNIFUZZ benchmark
programs. This database can be leveraged to match the crashes
with the corresponding CVEs conveniently. Compared with
the information provided on the official CVE website [53], the
information in CVE keywords database is better structured.
In CVE keywords database, each benchmark program has a
CVE table. Each entry of the table represents the information
of a CVE. The primary key of each entry is the CVE ID, and
the other attributes are the pivotal information of this CVE,
including vulnerability type, vulnerable functions, vulnera-
ble files, stack trace, the tool that generates the stack trace,
etc. Leveraging the CVE keywords database, we implement
a method that can conveniently generate the initial match-
ing results. Based on the CVE keywords database, the CVE
matching process is as follows. (1) Compile the program with
the corresponding tool (e.g., ASan) and execute the binary
with the crash to obtain the output report. (2) Extract the nec-
essary information from the output report, which includes the
stack trace, vulnerability type, vulnerable functions, vulnera-
ble file names, etc. (3) Match the extracted information with
the CVE table of the program in CVE keywords database
and report the initial matching CVEs sorted by the number
3We only use GDB to detect the bugs which cannot be found by ASan. Therefore,
a crash sample can only be mapped with one unique bug at most.
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of matched keywords. (4) Check the initial matching results
manually to obtain the final matching results. Note that the
official CVE website [53] has flaws and mistakes such as in-
complete information [54] and overlapped CVEs [55]. On the
other hand, it is possible that a 0-day vulnerability is found.
Thus, in this case, it is necessary to conduct the last step to
make the matching result more precise and accurate.
Discussion on the Ground Truth. In general, it is hard to
obtain the complete ground truth bugs for both the synthetic
and the real-world programs due to the nature of bugs. For
the synthetic benchmarks, whether the other parts (except for
the injected bugs) have bugs is unknown, which makes it hard
to obtain the complete ground truth. Similar for a real-world
program, except for the already known bugs, whether it has
new bugs is unknown. Even though, we try our best to provide
the information as accurate as possible for the benchmark in
the following manners. First, to mitigate the incompleteness
issue, we collect as many crash samples as possible to detect
the possible bugs in the benchmark programs. Second, we
use multiple tools to detect the bugs. In addition to the eight
coverage-based fuzzers, we combine three static analysis tools
(Flawfinder [56], RATS [57], Clang Static Analyzer [58]) with
the directed fuzzer, AFLGo [25], to find more bugs of the
UNIFUZZ benchmark. The details of the detection results are
presented in the UNIFUZZ open-source platform [16], due to
space limitation. Third, we analyze the bugs with multiple
tools (i.e., ASan and GDB) to reduce the impact caused by
the limitations of a single tool.
3.3 Performance Metrics
To address the problem of lacking comprehensive and prag-
matic performance metrics, we systematically study the per-
formance metrics of the existing fuzzing papers, summarize
and propose a set of metrics, which can be classified into six
categories: quantity of unique bugs, quality of bugs, speed of
finding bugs, stability of finding bugs, coverage and overhead.
Each category represents a property of a fuzzer‘s performance,
and each property can be evaluated by many concrete metrics
which are expandable. For example, when evaluating quantity
of unique bugs, we can leverage many concrete mathematical
metrics such as p value, Aˆ12 score [59]. In the following, we
present concrete metrics for each category as suggestions to
use in practical evaluations.
Quantity of Unique Bugs. As there exists randomness
with a fuzzing process, a robust fuzzing experiment has to be
repeated for multiple times to provide a more reliable result.
Therefore, the quantitative metrics of unique bugs are based
on statistical methods. We focus on two important questions:
(1) how many times should a fuzzing experiment be repeated?
and (2) what statistical metrics can provide reliable results?
There are different opinions about these questions. For ques-
tion (1), Klees et al. [13] suggested conducting each fuzz
testing for 30 repetitions. For question (2), Klees et al. [13]
stated that general statistical metrics such as mean, median
and variance may result in misleading conclusions. Besides,
they highly recommended to use statistical tests to calculate
the p value to determine whether there is a statistically sig-
nificant difference between the two fuzzers’ performance.
Specifically, they suggested using the Mann-Whitney U test
as the statistical test method instead of other methods. The
reason is that the Mann-Whitney U test is non-parametric
which makes no assumption on the distribution of the popula-
tion (as the distribution of fuzzing results, e.g., the number of
unique bugs in all repetitions is still unknown), whereas some
other methods are stricter. For instance, t-test assumes that the
two populations must obey normal distributions and have the
same variance. However, there are some different viewpoints
about statistical tests. For example, Nuzzo [60] pointed out
that the p value is not as reliable as many scientists assume,
and Wasserstein et al. [61] suggested that we should not draw
the conclusion that there is a statistically significant differ-
ence when p < 0.05, or there is not a statistically significant
difference when p > 0.05.
Based on the above discussion and our experience, our
suggestions for the two questions are as follows. For the
statistical metrics, as no single metric is perfect, it is better to
report a set of statistical metrics such as mean, median, the p
value, etc. In addition to measuring whether fuzzer A performs
better than fuzzer B, it is also important to measure how much
fuzzer A performs better than fuzzer B. To quantify the extent
of the difference between two fuzzers, it is recommended
to use the Vargha and Delaney Aˆ12 score [59] to show the
probability that fuzzer A performs better than fuzzer B. For
the number of repetitions, which is related to the selected
statistical metrics. For instance, the number of repetitions
should be larger than 20 when using the Mann-Whitney U
test [62]. In addition, it is necessary to conduct deeper research
on these two questions in the future.
Quality of Bugs. We define the quality of bugs from the
perspective of evaluating fuzzers’ performance. That is, the
quality of bugs should reflect not only the severity of bugs, but
also the effectiveness of fuzzers in finding rare bugs. A fuzzer
which can find more high quality bugs should be considered as
better. Specifically, we measure the quality of a bug from two
main aspects: (1) whether a bug has a higher level of severity
and (2) whether a bug is harder to be found. For aspect (1),
we can leverage analysis tools to measure the severity of a
bug. For example, Exploitable [63] is a GDB extension
that classifies Linux application bugs by severity. Moreover,
we can map a bug with its corresponding CVE and assess its
severity by the Common Vulnerability Score System (CVSS)
score [64] of the CVE. For aspect (2), a bug which is hard to
be found usually has the following characteristics: it can be
found by few fuzzers or it is mapped with a small amount of
crash samples.
Speed of Finding Bugs. Finding bugs quickly and effi-
ciently is important, especially when the time budget is lim-
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ited. We can measure the speed of finding bugs using the
following two approaches. First, for all the bugs of a program,
we can draw the cumulative curve of the number of all the de-
tected unique bugs within a pre-defined time. A higher slope
of the curve means a higher speed to find bugs, which is a
relatively qualitative metric. Second, for a specific bug, we
can record the time-to-exposure (TTE) metric to measure the
time that it is found by a fuzzer for the first time, which is a
relatively quantitative metric.
Stability of Finding Bugs. Stability is another important
metric. A fuzzer with higher stability is more reliable and
practical. We can quantify the stability of a fuzzer in the
following manner. First, we can calculate the relative standard
deviation (RSD) of the number of the found unique bugs
among all the repetitions. Lower RSD means better stability.
Second, for a specific bug, we can calculate the number of
times that a fuzzer can find it successfully. Higher success
rate represents that a fuzzer has better stability.
Coverage. Coverage metrics are used to measure a fuzzer’s
capability of exploring paths, which are also significant in
quantifying the capability of a fuzzer. As the vulnerable code
usually takes a tiny fraction of the entire code, only consid-
ering the number of bugs may not be able to distinguish the
fuzzers’ capability in exploring paths. Coverage metrics can
be measured with different granularity levels such as function,
basic block, edge and line coverage, etc.
Overhead. The overhead metrics instead aim to quantify
how many computing resources a fuzzer costs during the
fuzzing process, which are also important. For instance, we
may determine that a fuzzer performs well when we only
consider how many bugs it finds, but the determination may
be misleading if it costs much more computing resources than
others. This metric is instructive for users who have limited
computing resources or need to run multiple fuzzers in paral-
lel. The overhead of a fuzzer can be measured by the following
concrete metrics: CPU utilization, memory consumption, and
the amount of disk read/write, etc.
4 Evaluations of the State-of-the-art Fuzzers
Leveraging UNIFUZZ, we conduct extensive experiments on
the state-of-the-art fuzzers, and comprehensively compare
them in terms of the six categories of performance metrics.
Following the guidelines in [13], we conduct fuzz testing for
24 hours, with 30 repetitions.
4.1 Experiment Settings
Fuzzers. In our evaluations, we select eight state-of-the-art
coverage-based fuzzers from UNIFUZZ, including AFL [1],
AFLFast [2], Angora [3], Honggfuzz [4], MOPT [5],
QSYM [6], T-Fuzz [7] and VUzzer64 [8]. The reasons for se-
lecting these fuzzers are as follows. First, they are prominent
fuzzers at the time of writing this paper. AFL and Hongg-
fuzz are proposed in industry which have been widely applied
in practice. The other six fuzzers are presented at top secu-
rity conference in recent years, which represent advanced
fuzzing techniques in academia. Second, although there are
other advanced fuzzers such as CollAFL [24], they are not
open-source making them difficult to be evaluated. Third,
the eight selected fuzzers have better scalability than others
which can be used to test most of the programs. In compari-
son, other fuzzers such as QuickFuzz [45] can only generate
limited types of test cases4. Thus, they can only be tested
on a limited number of benchmark programs. Fourth, as it
is not appropriate to compare between fuzzers of different
types, here we only include coverage-based fuzzers to pro-
vide comparable evaluations. For other fuzzers incorporated
in UNIFUZZ, we mainly focus on testing their usability and
making them available. In addition, to make the evaluations
fairer and more comparable, we make necessary modifica-
tions on several fuzzers. For Angora, we change the input size
limitation from 15 KB to 1 MB, to make it fairly comparable
with the other fuzzers. For VUzzer64, we fix the issues (#10,
#11, #12 and #14) of its repository as these flaws are seri-
ous. In addition, we modify the value of the variable GENNUM,
which determines the number of generations, from 1,000 to
1,000,000 to make VUzzer64 fuzz for a longer time. For T-
Fuzz, we fix its “naming" flaw. All the above modifications
are to make the evaluation fairer. For the other fuzzers, we
keep them the same as the original design.
Programs. We leverage the 20 real-world programs (Table
2) provided by UNIFUZZ to evaluate the selected fuzzers. In
addition, we also use LAVA-M to explore the gap between
the synthetic and the real-world programs. Each benchmark
program is compiled according to each fuzzer’s requirements
in instrumentation or compilation. When validating the found
bugs, the programs are compiled with ASan and GDB, which
is same for all the fuzzers.
Initial Seeds. Following common practice in fuzzing, we
utilize the same initial seeds for the same benchmark program.
For the UNIFUZZ benchmark programs, we select the initial
seeds by the following process. First, we collect some seeds
with the corresponding file format from the Internet. Second,
we exclude the seeds which do not satisfy a fuzzer’s require-
ment (e.g., AFL requires the size of a seed be less than 1 MB).
Then, for the rest ones, we randomly select 100 seeds for each
program. For programs of LAVA-M, we use the default seed
set provided by LAVA-M.
Environments. We conduct all the experiments on 5
servers with the same equipment: 20 Intel Xeon E5-2650
v4 CPU cores with 2.20 GHz, 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. For
each fuzzer, we assign one CPU core, 2 GB RAM, and 1 GB
swap space. If a fuzzer cannot run successfully with 2 GB
memory, we increase the memory limit to 8 GB, with the same
4For instance, as QuickFuzz cannot generate .mp3 file, we cannot test QuickFuzz
on program mp3gain.
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(b) LAVA-M programs
Figure 2: The number of unique bugs detected by fuzzers.
resources allocated for all fuzzers in the same fuzzing exper-
iment5. We run each fuzzing experiment in an independent
Docker container.
Next we present the main evaluation results based on the
six categories of performance metrics, and we provide more
detailed evaluation results and datasets on the UNIFUZZ open-
source platform [16]. Note that T-Fuzz costs too much mem-
ory when fuzzing program ffmpeg, and VUzzer64 cannot
test program sqlite3 because it does not support input from
stdin. Thus, we do not include the results of the above cases.
4.2 Quantity of Unique Bugs
The main objective of this subsection is to figure out which
fuzzer can find more unique bugs. As described in Section
3.2, we leverage the output report produced by ASan [20] to
extract the top three functions in the stack trace as a triple
to de-duplicate bugs. The bugs that have the different triples
and vulnerability types are considered as unique. For bugs
that cannot be detected by ASan [20], we further leverage the
output report produced by other tools such as GDB [21] as a
supplement6, as we find that there exist some bugs, e.g., float
5We do not start all experiments at 8 GB due to resource limitations. As the same
resources are allocated for all fuzzers in the same fuzzing experiment, the evaluations
are fair.
6When verifying the crashes found by T-Fuzz, if the crashes cannot make the origi-
nal program crash, we then use CrashAnalyzer (provided by the developers of T-Fuzz)
to generate new crashes and verify them. However, we find that whether using Crash-
point exception bugs which can be detected by GDB, while
not ASan.
Number of Unique Bugs. We visualize the number of
unique bugs found by each fuzzer on the real-world pro-
grams of the UNIFUZZ benchmark and LAVA-M in 30 repeti-
tions in Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) respectively. From these
figures, we have the following observations. (1) No fuzzer
outperforms others on all the programs. (2) For the 20 real-
world programs, QSYM performs the best on five programs
(gdk, jhead, lame, mujs, tcpdump). Angora performs the
best on three programs (exiv2, wav2swf, nm). Honggfuzz per-
forms the best on three programs (ffmpeg, flvmeta, cflow).
MOPT performs the best on three programs (imginfo, lame,
pdftotext). AFL performs the best on program tiffsplit.
AFLFast, T-Fuzz and VUzzer64 fail to achieve the best perfor-
mance on any target program. (3) For the programs of LAVA-
M, Angora performs the best among the selected fuzzers,
while QSYM only achieves similar performance as Angora
on program md5sum.
Statistical Results. Here we present the statistical results
of the number of unique bugs found by the fuzzers in 30 repe-
titions. Due to space limitation, we only present two statistical
results: p value and Aˆ12 score. We defer the other statistical
Analyzer has no impact on our experiment results. For the tested 20 programs, T-Fuzz
does not generate transformed binaries for 17 programs (the reason is that T-Fuzz will
not generate transformed binaries if there is no “stuck" state), which means there is no
need to use CrashAnalyzer. For the three programs (jhead, flvmeta and wav2swf),
the CrashAnalyzer does not produce new crashes.
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Table 3: The p value and the Aˆ12 score of the number of unique bugs in 30 repetitions with AFL as the baseline.
AFL AFLFast Angora Honggfuzz MOPT QSYM T-Fuzz VUzzer64
Avg p-val Aˆ12 p-val Aˆ12 p-val Aˆ12 p-val Aˆ12 p-val Aˆ12 p-val Aˆ12 p-val Aˆ12
R
ea
l-w
or
ld
Pr
og
ra
m
s
exiv2 1.7 0.01 0.32 < 0.01 0.97 0.27 0.55 < 0.01 0.83 < 0.01 0.78 < 0.01 0.17 < 0.01 0.17
gdk 0.3 0.11 0.58 < 0.01 0.92 0.21 0.55 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 0.85 0.18 0.56
imginfo 0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 0.75 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5
jhead 0 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 0.78 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 0.7 1.0 0.5
tiffsplit 6.6 < 0.01 0.25 < 0.01 0.12 < 0.01 0 0.26 0.55 0.01 0.33 < 0.01 0.06 < 0.01 0
lame 3 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 0.75 < 0.01 0.8 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 0.98 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 0
mp3gain 5.5 0.28 0.46 0.13 0.42 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 0.71 < 0.01 0.98 < 0.01 0.03 < 0.01 0
wav2swf 2.2 0.07 0.43 < 0.01 0.94 < 0.01 0.35 < 0.01 0.72 0.28 0.53 < 0.01 0 < 0.01 0.12
ffmpeg 0.37 < 0.01 0.82 < 0.01 0.32 < 0.01 0.87 0.02 0.63 < 0.01 0.32 n.a. n.a. < 0.01 0.32
flvmeta 3.63 0.39 0.48 0.04 0.6 < 0.01 0.96 < 0.01 0.68 < 0.01 0.21 0.37 0.52 < 0.01 0
mp42aac 0.07 < 0.01 0.8 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 0.68 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 0.9 0.08 0.47 0.08 0.47
cflow 0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 0.67
infotocap 1.73 0.08 0.6 < 0.01 0.03 < 0.01 0.06 < 0.01 0.97 < 0.01 0.85 < 0.01 0.03 < 0.01 0.05
jq 0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 1.0 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5
mujs 0 0.04 0.55 1.0 0.5 0.04 0.55 0.01 0.58 < 0.01 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5
pdftotext 0.3 < 0.01 0.69 < 0.01 0.85 < 0.01 0.71 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 0.37 < 0.01 0.37
sqlite3 0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 0.72 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 0.93 1.0 0.5 n.a. n.a.
nm 0 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 0.93 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5
objdump 1.33 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 0.89 < 0.01 0.31 < 0.01 0.99 0.12 0.58 0.01 0.42 < 0.01 0
tcpdump 0 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 0.88 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5
L
AV
A
-M
uniq 0 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 1.0 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 0.77 < 0.01 0.95 0.08 0.53 < 0.01 0.92
base64 0.03 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 0.64 < 0.01 0.69 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 0.98
md5sum 0.03 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 1.0 0.17 0.48 0.08 0.55 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0
who 0 1.0 0.5 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0 0.08 0.53 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0 < 0.01 1.0
results such as mean and median values on the UNIFUZZ
open-source platform [16]. The p value aims to quantify
whether there is a significant difference between two popula-
tions (corresponding to two fuzzers in our setting). Aˆ12 score
is used to measure the effect size (i.e., the probability that one
fuzzer is better than the other according to all the repetitions).
Here, we use AFL as the baseline fuzzer following most previ-
ous works [13]. Specifically, we leverage the Mann-Whitney
U test to calculate the p value, and we consider p < 0.05 as
an indicator that there exists a significant difference. For Aˆ12
score, we consider Aˆ12 ≥ 0.71 as an indicator that there is a
large effect size [59]. Table 3 shows the p value and the Aˆ12
score of the number of unique bugs in 30 repetitions. From
Table 3, we have the following observations. (1) None of the
remaining seven fuzzers outperforms AFL significantly on all
the real-world programs. Nevertheless, there exists fuzzers
(Angora, QSYM and VUzzer64) that outperform AFL signif-
icantly on all four programs of LAVA-M. (2) Based on the
results of p value, MOPT performs significantly better than
AFL on 17 real-world programs, which is the most among
the seven fuzzers. QSYM, Angora and Honggfuzz perform
significantly better than AFL on 13, 11 and 11 real-world
programs respectively. However, AFLFast only performs sig-
nificantly better than AFL on 4 real-world programs. Even
worse, T-Fuzz and VUzzer64 do not outperform AFL signif-
icantly on any real-world program. (3) Considering the Aˆ12
score metric, the fuzzers have the similar performance com-
pared with the p value metric. The fuzzers that have large
effect size (Aˆ12 ≥ 0.71) all outperform significantly (p value
< 0.05) than AFL, but not vice versa. For instance, AFLFast
outperforms significantly than AFL on mujs (p = 0.04), but
the effect size (Aˆ12 = 0.55) is not large.
Table 4: The number of CVEs with high severity.
AFL AFLFast Angora Honggfuzz MOPT QSYM T-Fuzz VUzzer64
exiv2 1 1 4 2 3 2 0 0
gdk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
imginfo 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0
jhead 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
tiffsplit 3 3 3 1 3 2 3 0
lame 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 0
mp3gain 3 3 3 5 5 5 2 1
wav2swf 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
ffmpeg 0 0 0 1 0 0 n.a. 0
flvmeta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
mp42aac 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
cflow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
infotocap 1 1 0 1 2 2 0 0
jq 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
mujs 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
pdftotext 2 2 1 2 4 2 1 0
sqlite3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
nm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
objdump 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
tcpdump 0 0 4 0 3 57 0 0
Table 5: The average number of unique EXPLOITABLE bugs.
AFL AFLFast Angora Honggfuzz MOPT QSYM T-Fuzz VUzzer64
exiv2 1.3 0.5 6.7 0.1 4.9 0.3 0 0
gdk 0.0 0.3 1.2 0 7.9 2.3 4.7 0.5
imginfo 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0
jhead 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 0.2 0
tiffsplit 0.7 0.8 0.2 0 0.8 0 0.7 0
lame 1.0 1.0 5.8 3.4 9.2 3.1 1.0 0
mp3gain 0.1 0.1 0 2.0 0.8 0.8 0 0
wav2swf 3.0 3.1 3.0 0.1 10.0 3.0 0 0.3
ffmpeg 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 n.a. 0
flvmeta 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.1 0
mp42aac 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.5 0 0
cflow 0 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 0
infotocap 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0
jq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
mujs 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0
pdftotext 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.7 7.2 5.0 0 0
sqlite3 0 0 0 0 3.1 0 0 n.a.
nm 0 0 4.8 0 0 0 0 0
objdump 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.5 3.2 0 0.2 0
tcpdump 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0
4.3 The Quality of Bugs
As explained in Section 3.3, we define bug quality based on
their severity and the rareness.
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4.3.1 Severity of Bugs
The severity of bugs can be quantified by the CVE CVSS
score [64] and the results of Exploitable [63].
CVE CVSS. CVSS [64] provides a numerical score for
each CVE to quantify its severity. A CVE is considered as
highly severe when the score is greater than or equal to 7.0.
We leverage the CVE keywords database and the matching
method in Section 3.2 to get the initial CVE matching re-
sults. Then, we manually check the initial results to obtain
the final matching results. Further, we associate each CVE
with the corresponding CVSS score. During the CVE match-
ing process, we also find six new CVEs: CVE-2019-17450,
CVE-2019-17451, CVE-2019-17594, CVE-2019-17595, CVE-
2019-18359 and CVE-2019-19035. Table 4 shows the number
of CVEs with high severity found by the fuzzers, and we pro-
vide more detailed information of the found CVEs on the
UNIFUZZ open-source platform [16], including the concrete
CVSS score and the vulnerability type. As presented in Ta-
ble 4, the fuzzers have preference on specific programs in
discovering highly severe CVEs. For instance, QSYM dis-
covers 57 highly severe CVEs on tcpdump, while Honggfuzz
cannot discover any one. However, for ffmpeg, Honggfuzz
can discover one highly severe CVE, while the remaining
fuzzers (including QSYM) cannot find any one. Moreover, it
is interesting to note that AFL and AFLFast are comparable
with respect to the number of discovered highly severe CVEs
on each program.
Results of Exploitable. Exploitable [63] is a GDB
extension that uses a heuristic algorithm to assess the ex-
ploitability of a crash, which can be classified into four cate-
gories: EXPLOITABLE, PROBABLY_EXPLOITABLE, PROB-
ABLY_NOT_EXPLOITABLE and UNKNOWN. Specifically,
we de-duplicate the number of bugs of each category by the
hash value produced by Exploitable. Table 5 presents the
of unique bugs that are classified as EXPLOITABLE. As pre-
sented in Table 5, MOPT outperforms the other fuzzers on 9
programs in detecting EXPLOITABLE bugs. Angora, Hong-
gfuzz and QSYM achieve the best performance on 3, 5 and
3 programs, respectively. Nevertheless, VUzzer64 does not
perform well as it can only detect EXPLOITABLE bugs on 2
programs.
4.3.2 Rareness of Bugs
It is intuitive that a bug that can be found by fewer fuzzers is
relatively harder to be found (e.g., is located in deeper path
or has more complicated path constraints). Here, we call a
bug that can be found by only one fuzzer a rare bug7. Cor-
respondingly, a fuzzer that can find more unique rare bugs
is relatively more powerful. Table 6 shows the number of
unique rare bugs discovered by the evaluated fuzzers. For
7The value of this metric is not an absolute value such as the number of unique
bugs, while providing a relative measure that depends on the compared fuzzers.
Table 6: The number of discovered unique rare bugs.
AFL AFLFast Angora Honggfuzz MOPT QSYM T-Fuzz VUzzer64
exiv2 8 1 17 0 22 0 0 0
gdk 0 0 2 0 1 13 0 1
imginfo 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0
jhead 0 0 1 0 0 15 2 0
tiffsplit 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0
lame 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
mp3gain 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
wav2swf 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
ffmpeg 0 0 0 3 0 0 n.a. 0
flvmeta 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
mp42aac 0 0 2 0 8 7 0 0
cflow 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
infotocap 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0
jq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
mujs 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0
pdftotext 0 0 0 0 35 7 0 0
sqlite3 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 n.a.
nm 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0
objdump 0 1 6 0 4 5 0 0
tcpdump 0 0 1 0 4 204 0 0
Total 8 2 56 9 90 262 2 1
all the real-world programs, QSYM achieves the best perfor-
mance by discovering 262 unique rare bugs. MOPT achieves
the second best performance and discovers 90 unique rare
bugs. Angora finds 56 unique rare bugs in total. Neverthe-
less, AFLFast only detects rare bugs on two programs. AFL,
T-Fuzz and VUzzer64 only detect rare bugs on one program.
It is worth noting that fuzzers also have preference on tar-
get programs in discovering rare bugs. For instance, QSYM
discovers 204 unique rare bugs on tcpdump, while in com-
parison Angora only discovers one rare bug and the other
fuzzers fail to find any rare bug. For nm, Angora can discover
25 unique rare bugs, while the remaining fuzzers including
QSYM fail to discover any rare bug.
4.4 Speed of Finding Bugs
Figure 3 presents the average number of unique bugs found
over time in 30 repetitions, where we can see the fuzzers’
speed of finding bugs. First, one intuitive observation is that
no fuzzer wins the others on all the programs on this metric.
Second, the comparisons among fuzzers’ performance may
get reverse over time. For instance, MOPT finds less unique
bugs than QSYM on program sqlite3 in the early time, but
it finds more unique bugs than QSYM after 10 hours. Third,
although some fuzzers find the similar number of unique bugs,
their speeds of finding bugs are different. For instance, An-
gora, MOPT and QSYM find a similar number of unique bugs
on program mp42aac (2.5, 2.6 and 2.4 unique bugs in average,
respectively) within 24 hours, while MOPT finds the bugs
more quickly than Angora and QSYM. This observation also
indicates the importance of the speed metric, as only leverag-
ing the number of unique bugs may overlook the difference
of fuzzers in speed.
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Figure 3: The average number of unique bugs found over time in 30 repetitions.
Figure 4: The RSD of the number of unique bugs.
4.5 Stability of Finding Bugs
Figure 4 presents the relative standard deviation (RSD) of
the number of unique bugs in all the 30 repetitions, where
a lower RSD represents better stability of a fuzzer. As de-
picted in Figure 4, first, all the fuzzers are not always stable
in finding bugs, which reflects the randomness of fuzzing
and the importance of repetitions. Second, among the seven
fuzzers, Angora and T-Fuzz achieve lower RSD, while AFL
and Honggfuzz achieve higher RSD. Third, the stability of
a fuzzer varies with different programs. For instance, AFL
has better stability on several programs such as tiffsplit,
mp3gain, as compared to that on mp42aac. It needs to be
noted that the stability of finding bugs metrics are auxiliary
to the quantity of unique bugs metrics, as finding more bugs
are more important than finding less bugs stably.
4.6 Coverage
Existing fuzzers track the coverage of a target program with
different manners and granularities. For instance, AFL [1]
leverages compile-time instrumentation and bitmap to track
edge coverage. Honggfuzz [4] leverages SanitizerCoverage
instrumentation [65] to track basic block coverage. In order to
fairly compare these fuzzers’ capability of finding paths, it is
necessary to design a uniform method (with the same instru-
mentation method and under the same granularity) to track
the coverage for different fuzzers. One intuitive method is to
save all the test cases executed by the fuzzers, then calculate
their coverage with the same instrumented binary program.
Nevertheless, this method is impractical as the number of ex-
ecuted test cases is tremendous. To strike a balance between
precision and efficiency, we develop an efficient method to
track the coverage by only considering the test cases that im-
prove the coverage. Specifically, we save all the test cases
that increase the coverage during the fuzzing process, then
we leverage afl-cov [66] to calculate the line coverage of each
program with the saved test cases. Figure 6 shows the results
of line coverage, from which we observe that no fuzzer sta-
bly achieves higher coverage than the others. By comparing
Figure 2(a) and Figure 6, we observe that higher coverage
does not necessarily mean more unique bugs. For instance,
MOPT achieves the highest coverage on tcpdump among
all the fuzzers while QSYM discovers the most unique bugs
on tcpdump. To further explore the relationship between the
number of unique bugs and line coverage, we calculate the
Spearman correlation coefficient rs between them, which is a
non-parametric measure of correlation between two variables
and rs ∈ [−1,+1]. A positive rs means that the two variables
are positively correlated and vice versa. Figure 5 presents
the value of rs between the number of unique bugs and line
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coverage, where we observe that most of them are less than
0.60, which means that the correlation between the number
of unique bugs and the line coverage is not strong.
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Figure 5: The Spearman’s correlation coefficient rs between
the number of unique bugs and line coverage.
Table 7: The memory consumption (MB) of each fuzzer.
AFL AFLFast Angora Honggfuzz MOPT QSYM T-Fuzz VUzzer64
avg max avg max avg max avg max avg max avg max avg max avg max
exiv2 11 25 13 37 23 918 423 1,989 24 41 209 993 3,319 4,051 96 1,139
gdk 8 454 8 14 22 575 350 1,831 13 76 91 401 442 454 104 2048
imginfo 5 10 5 51 23 774 140 1,990 18 200 119 1,979 919 925 42 2,048
jhead 7 12 7 20 13 28 60 77 8 13 79 188 265 313 18 30
tiffsplit 16 213 14 73 22 55 100 1,930 18 654 42 97 567 765 122 474
lame 13 17 13 22 1,705 2,047 53 76 20 29 81 148 758 1,038 56 450
mp3gain 9 12 12 16 34 46 34 48 17 23 104 276 346 354 109 468
wav2swf 40 53 20 82 76 415 444 4,087 16 94 134 471 598 682 114 2,035
ffmpeg 17 596 19 502 27 246 734 5,533 77 1,254 212 1,780 n.a. n.a. 849 8,195
flvmeta 9 14 9 14 19 27 24 50 12 15 598 1,873 470 694 154 318
mp42aac 8 23 9 15 58 532 60 1745 18 176 222 2,826 1,155 1,194 112 670
cflow 6 7 7 8 1,133 2,023 38 60 23 35 125 597 479 489 261 1,978
infotocap 14 23 15 40 24 27 316 428 24 38 496 1,361 597 606 184 636
jq 9 11 9 12 13 15 50 72 13 16 78 113 619 783 49 392
mujs 17 45 16 30 552 1,533 52 88 23 44 113 2,013 578 729 56 1,623
pdftotext 27 76 27 40 4,857 7,861 161 1,967 92 149 139 1,786 2,050 2,055 396 1,190
sqlite3 240 595 205 2,031 1,833 2,042 199 1,249 453 1,560 780 1,790 1,580 2,095 n.a. n.a.
nm 8 34 8 26 102 1,350 279 2,046 35 50 78 350 1,739 2,265 57 460
objdump 13 171 13 70 108 574 495 2,048 49 1,953 137 2,698 2,625 3,472 849 1,368
tcpdump 15 38 16 38 264 607 330 2,040 83 107 160 350 1,464 2,296 119 322
Avg 24.6 121.5 22.2 157.1 545.4 1,084.8 217.1 1,467.7 51.8 326.4 199.8 1,104.5 1,082.6 1,329.5 197.2 1,360.2
4.7 Overhead
Table 7 shows the average and maximum memory consump-
tion of each fuzzer, where we obtain the following observa-
tions. (1) From a holistic aspect, AFL, AFLFast and MOPT
consume less memory during fuzzing than the other fuzzers,
with average memory consumption 24.6 MB, 22.2 MB and
51.8 MB respectively. Nevertheless, T-Fuzz consumes 1,082
MB memory during fuzzing, which is almost 50 times more
than that of AFLFast and is the most among the fuzzers. One
possible reason is that T-Fuzz leverages Angr [67] to get
the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of the programs, which may
take much memory. (2) When fuzzing the same program,
the memory consumption of different fuzzers varies signifi-
cantly. For example, when fuzzing program exiv2, AFL uses
no more than 25 MB memory, while in comparison, T-Fuzz
uses about 4 GB memory. (3) For the same fuzzer, its mem-
ory consumption on various programs also differ greatly. For
instance, Angora uses more than 7 GB memory when test-
ing pdftotext while its memory consumption on the other
programs is less than 2 GB.
5 Further Analysis
Here we conduct evaluations to investigate the previously
overlooked factors that may significantly affect a fuzzer’s
performance, including instrumentation methods and crash
analysis tools.
5.1 Instrumentation Methods
Fuzzers may implement instrumentations in different man-
ners, which leads to diverse characteristics in the compiled
binaries. For instance, AFL and Angora implement compile-
time instrumentation by writing a wrapper of a compiler (e.g.,
afl-clang, angora-clang), while VUzzer leverages Intel
PIN [68] to implement binary instrumentation. Therefore, a
natural question is: whether different instrumentation meth-
ods affect fuzzing evaluation? We raise this question based on
the following observations. For programs such as infotocap,
certain crash samples can only make the AFL-instrumented
binary crash rather than Angora-instrumented binary. By ana-
lyzing these bugs of infotocap, we find that they are related
to the compilation methods. In this scenario, the failure for
Angora to discover these crash samples is due to its instrumen-
tation method rather than its capability of discovering bugs.
However, if we overlook the employed different instrumenta-
tion methods, we may draw a potentially unfair conclusion
that AFL is better than Angora with respect to the detected
bugs in this scenario.
Here, we provide an example to show that the compilation
methods can impact the bugs. Figure 7 shows a C/C++ code
snippet, where there is a heap buffer overflow vulnerability
in line 4. However, certain compile-time optimization may
skip the erroneous assignment (x[i]=0 in line 4) and treat the
whole assignment statement as a constant zero to print. We
compile this code with different compilers (gcc and clang)
and with different optimization levels (O0 - O3). Then, we
find that the heap buffer overflow vulnerability cannot be trig-
gered when using clang with optimization level O1 - O3,
but can be triggered when using gcc with optimization level
O0 - O3 and clang with optimization level O0. As it is diffi-
cult to require all the fuzzers to use the same instrumentation
method in practice, the difference caused by different compila-
tion (instrumentation) methods cannot be avoided. Therefore,
a potentially better solution is using cross validation when
analyzing the crash samples, i.e., re-execute the crash sam-
ples with different complied binaries to check if they can only
cause parts of binaries to crash.
12
    
    
    
    
    
 H [ L Y 
   
    
    
    
    
 J G N
    
    
    
    
    
 L P J L Q I R
   
   
   
   
 M K H D G
    
    
    
    
 W L I I V S O L W
    
    
    
    
    
 O D P H
    
    
    
    
    
 P S  J D L Q
   
   
   
   
 Z D Y  V Z I
 
    
     
     
     
 I I P S H J
   
   
   
   
 I O Y P H W D
    
    
    
    
 P S   D D F
    
    
    
    
 F I O R Z
    
    
    
    
 L Q I R W R F D S
    
    
    
    
    
 M T
    
    
    
    
 P X M V
    
    
    
     
     
 S G I W R W H [ W
 
    
     
     
     
 V T O L W H 
    
    
    
    
 Q P
    
    
    
    
    
 R E M G X P S
    
     
     
     
 W F S G X P S
 $ ) /  $ ) / ) D V W  $ Q J R U D  + R Q J J I X ] ]  0 2 3 7  4 6 < 0  7  ) X ] ]  9 8 ] ] H U  
Figure 6: Line coverage on the real-world programs.
1 c h a r * x= m a l lo c ( 1 ) ;
2 f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i <1000000; i ++) {
3 / * x [ i ]=0 i s a heap b u f f e r o v e r f l o w * /
4 p r i n t f ( " [%d]=%c \ n " , i , x [ i ] = 0 ) ;
5 }
Figure 7: An example of heap buffer overflow vulnerability.
5.2 Crash Analysis Tools
Different tools have been proposed to analyze what bugs
can be triggered by crash samples such as ASan [20] and
GDB [21]. During our evaluations, interestingly, we find that
using different tools to analyze crash samples can lead to
different results, e.g., different numbers of discovered unique
bugs. To further examine this, we use ASan and GDB to
analyze the crash samples collected from the experiments
in Section 4. If a bug can be discovered by executing the
ASan- (resp., GDB-) compiled binary with a crash sample,
we consider the corresponding crash sample as validated with
ASan (resp., GDB). To show the influence of different tools in
analyzing crash samples, we list the number of crash samples
that can be validated by different tools in Table 8. For the
collected 329,857 crash samples, only 61.1% of them can
be validated by both ASan and GDB. 14.5% of them can
only be validated by GDB and 12.2% of them can only be
validated by ASan. Moreover, neither tool can validate the
remaining 12.2% crash samples. It is a bit surprising to see
that ASan, as a widely adopted analysis tool, only validates
73.3% (12.2%+61.1%) of these crash samples.
Using one analysis tool singly may limit the number of
detected bugs, which may further fail to provide comprehen-
sive evaluations on fuzzers. For instance, during our fuzzing
experiments in Section 4, we find some crash samples that can
trigger float point exception bugs on ffmpeg. However, we
cannot discover the float point exception bugs by executing
ASan-compiled binary with these crash samples, while GDB
can discover them. Figure 8 shows the number of unique bugs
discovered by the fuzzers on ffmpeg with ASan and GDB. As
shown in Figure 8, the evaluation results are different when
using different analysis tools. When using ASan, only Hongg-
fuzz can discover bugs, while using GDB, AFL and AFLFast
can also discover bugs. Therefore, it would be better to com-
bine more tools together to analyze crash samples instead of
relying on a single tool that may neglect some bugs. In our
evaluation (Section 4), we use ASan as the main tool to detect
bugs, while adopting GDB as a supplement.
Table 8: Validated crash samples by different tools.
Bug Type Number Rate
Neither ASAN or GDB can validate 40,122 12.2%
Only GDB can validate 47,910 14.5%
Only ASAN can validate 40,267 12.2%
Both ASAN and GDB can validate 201,558 61.1%
Total 329,857 100%
AFL AFLFast Angora Honggfuzz MOPT QSYM T-Fuzz VUzzer64
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ug
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Figure 8: The number of unique bugs discovered on ffmpeg
with GDB and ASan.
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6 Discussion
We discuss the issues in the current fuzzing research field
along with our work in this paper as follows.
6.1 The Usability of Fuzzers
A fuzzer with good usability can facilitate its application in
practice. Nevertheless, based on our evaluations, we find that
the usability issues of fuzzers, especially the academic fuzzers,
are more serious than we thought. These usability issues
include: having (serious) flaws in implementation, failing
to be reproduced, etc. Even worse, some of the fuzzers that
have these issues are published at premier conferences in
recent years. In this paper, we test the usability of 35 fuzzers,
make them available on the UNIFUZZ platform, and conduct
extensive evaluations on eight of them. We hope that this
work can facilitate further research on improving the usability
and the performance of fuzzers.
How to conduct a comprehensive measurement on the us-
ability of fuzzers is an interesting and significant research
topic. Nevertheless, the usability of fuzzers is a relatively
subjective topic, and it is affected by many factors. First, the
usability of a fuzzer highly depends on the domain knowledge
of the users. A fuzzing expert may easily use a fuzzer even
without the documentation, while a beginner may feel hard to
use a fuzzer with poor documentation. Second, there are many
factors that can affect the usability of a fuzzer including doc-
umentation style, the issues of dependent libraries and tools,
the issues of its implementation, the robustness in fuzzing
process, etc. For the future research on this problem, we pro-
vide the following feasible ways as suggestions. (1) Check
the correctness and completeness of a fuzzer’s documentation
(e.g., whether there exists inconsistency between the docu-
mentation and the implementation). It is also an interesting
and meaningful research topic on providing guidance or stan-
dards on writing the documentation. (2) Test whether a fuzzer
can be successfully installed and pass author-provided tests.
(3) Test the robustness of a fuzzer during the fuzzing process,
and observe whether it has abnormal behaviors (e.g., whether
the fuzzer itself crashes during fuzzing). (4) Test whether a
fuzzer can reproduce the experimental results as it reported
in its paper.
6.2 Fuzzing Experiments
Conducting correct fuzzing experiments is the base of the
appropriate evaluations. Klees et al. [13] proposed several
guidelines in fuzzing evaluation such as multiple repetitions,
using different seed sets, etc. In addition, here we discuss
some practical issues that need to be considered when con-
ducting fuzzing experiments. First, it is important to monitor
the operating status of a fuzzing experiment such as CPU
utilization to determine whether the experiment is executed
normally. In general, if the CPU utilization rate is low (e.g.,
less than 80%), it may indicate that the fuzzing status is ab-
normal. For instance, when there is a large amount of disk
I/O operations, CPU has to wait for these operations before
it does real fuzzing work. Second, it is important to mitigate
unnecessary disk I/O operations, especially when conducting
many fuzzing experiments on a sever simultaneously, where
disk I/O can easily become the bottleneck. For instance, the
target program may output a large amount of new files dur-
ing the fuzzing process, which may cause heavy disk output
operations, while these output files are not important for eval-
uations. In this situation, it is suggested using a RAM disk or
not saving the output files generated by the target benchmark
program.
6.3 The Benchmarks for Evaluating Fuzzers
The current fuzzing benchmarks are not satisfactory [13]. Con-
sidering the practical usability issue, we construct a pragmatic
benchmark suite which consists of 20 real-world programs at
the current version and has the following advantages. First, the
UNIFUZZ benchmark programs have various expressiveness
in functionality, size, vulnerability, etc., which can provide
comprehensive evaluations on fuzzers and can better reflect
a fuzzer’s performance on the real-world programs. Second,
the UNIFUZZ benchmark can be used to provide more ob-
jective and fairer evaluations. As shown in Section 4, no
fuzzer outperforms the others on all programs, which some-
how demonstrates the bias and subjectivity in many existing
fuzzing papers. Third, different from traditional benchmark
design methods that inject artificial bugs, our method does
not change the original code of the real-world programs in
order to keep its raw features, but focusing on providing con-
venient offline result analysis methods. Specifically, for each
program, we provide crash analysis methods including crash
triage, CVE matching, bug severity analysis, etc. Therefore,
the UNIFUZZ benchmark is easily usable like the synthetic
benchmarks. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to construct the CVE keywords database which
greatly reduces the human labors in CVE matching.
Note that fuzzing benchmarks need to be updated and im-
proved with the development of fuzzers, and there still needs
more research on designing benchmarks. That is why we de-
sign UNIFUZZ as an open-source and extensible platform.
There are still limitations with the UNIFUZZ benchmark and
can be improved and extended from many perspectives. First,
in this paper, we select the programs mainly from the top
fuzzing papers. In the future, there are many other resources
such as vulnerability-related websites [53, 69–72] that can
be leveraged to select programs. Second, the current UNI-
FUZZ benchmark mainly focuses on the general program-
level fuzzers. It would be better to incorporate UNIFUZZ with
more benchmarks for other types of fuzzers such as compiler
fuzzers and kernel fuzzers.
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6.4 Performance Metrics
The existing metrics are rough and incomprehensive. To solve
the problem, UNIFUZZ provides six categories of metrics
which aim to provide more comprehensive evaluations on
fuzzers. Here we discuss the limitation of these metrics along
with the related interesting research questions which can be
considered as the future work. First is the categories of the
metrics. In this paper we classify the metrics into six cate-
gories. It calls for more research to provide a more reasonable
classification. Second, it needs more research on the concrete
metrics of each category. For instance, we use the CVSS score
and the Exploitable tool to evaluate the severity of the bugs.
However, each individual metric has its own limitation. As
the CVSS score takes multiple factors (e.g., attack complexity
and required privileges) into consideration, the single numeric
score may not be able to accurately reflect the impact of each
individual perspective. Exploitable determines the sever-
ity of a bug based on a list of rules, whose accuracy may
be affected by the rationality of the rules. Thus, the choice
of concrete metrics to evaluate the severity of bugs should
be updated when better standards/methods are proposed. In
addition, it needs more theoretical research on the metrics.
For instance, when conducting statistical test on the number
of unique bugs, we can only use non-parametric statistical
methods such as the Mann-Whitney U test, which makes no
assumption on the distribution of the population. It is interest-
ing to study the distribution of the number of bugs in multiple
repetitions and provide more suitable metrics to assess it.
Third, it is necessary to study the priority of each metric. In
our opinion, the number of bugs and the quality of bugs are
more important than the stability of finding bugs, as finding
less or trivial bugs stably is much less valuable than finding
more high-risk bugs occasionally. Fourth, it could be desir-
able to design a scoring method which combines different
metrics to generate a conclusive numerical score for assessing
a fuzzer’s performance.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose and implement UNIFUZZ, an open-
source, holistic, and pragmatic metrics-driven platform for
evaluating fuzzers in a comprehensive and fair manner. UNI-
FUZZ has incorporated 35 fuzzers, 20 real-world benchmark
programs, and six categories of performance metrics. We
test the usability of the 35 fuzzers and discover a number
of flaws. Leveraging UNIFUZZ, we systematically compare
the state-of-the-art fuzzers. Based on the experimental re-
sults, we have the following important observations. First, no
fuzzer always performs better than others, revealing potential
subjectivity and bias in the evaluations of existing fuzzing
works. Second, the performance of fuzzers on the synthetic
benchmark programs may not be consistent with that on the
real-world programs, which confirms the importance of us-
ing pragmatic benchmark programs. Third, the performance
of fuzzers varies with different performance metrics, which
indicates that the fuzzers need to be evaluated with more
comprehensive performance metrics for reliable assessments.
In addition, we identify new factors such as instrumentation
methods and crash analysis tools that can significantly affect
the evaluation of fuzzers. We have made UNIFUZZ publicly
available to facilitate future fuzzing research.
Acknowledgments
We sincerely appreciate the anonymous reviewers for their
valuable comments to improve our paper. This work was
partly supported by the National Key Research and Devel-
opment Program of China under No. 2018YFB0804102
and No. 2020YFB1804705, NSFC under No. U1936215,
U1836202, and 61772466, the Zhejiang Provincial Natural
Science Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholars un-
der No. LR19F020003, the Zhejiang Provincial Key R&D
Program under No. 2019C01055, the Fundamental Research
Funds for the Central Universities (Zhejiang University NG-
ICS Platform), the Ant Financial Research Funding, the Indus-
trial Internet innovation and development project under No.
TC190A449, the Key Research and Development Program of
Zhejiang Province under No. 2020C01021, and Major Scien-
tific Project of Zhejiang Lab under No. 2018FD0ZX01. Peng
Cheng’s research was partly supported by NSFC under grant
61833015. Ting Wang’s research was partly supported by
the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1953893,
1953813, and 1951729. Wei-Han Lee’s research was spon-
sored by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the U.K.
Ministry of Defence under Agreement Number W911NF-16-
3-0001. The views and conclusions contained in this docu-
ment are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as
representing the official policies, either expressed or implied,
of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, the U.S. Government,
the U.K. Ministry of Defence or the U.K. Government. The
U.S. and U.K. Governments are authorized to reproduce and
distribute reprints for Government purposes notwithstanding
any copyright notation hereon.
References
[1] M. Zalewski, “american fuzzy lop,” http://lcamtuf.
coredump.cx/afl/, 2017.
[2] M. Böhme, V.-T. Pham, and A. Roychoudhury,
“Coverage-based greybox fuzzing as markov chain,” in
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2016,
pp. 1032–1043.
[3] P. Chen and H. Chen, “Angora: Efficient fuzzing by
principled search,” in Proceedings of the 39th IEEE
15
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2018, pp. 711–
725.
[4] Google, “honggfuzz,” https://google.github.io/
honggfuzz/, 2017.
[5] C. Lyu, S. Ji, C. Zhang, Y. Li, W. Lee, Y. Song, and
R. Beyah, “MOPT: Optimized mutation scheduling for
fuzzers,” in Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security
Symposium, 2019, pp. 1949–1966.
[6] I. Yun, S. Lee, M. Xu, Y. Jang, and T. Kim, “QSYM: A
practical concolic execution engine tailored for hybrid
fuzzing,” in Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security
Symposium, 2018, pp. 745–761.
[7] H. Peng, Y. Shoshitaishvili, and M. Payer, “T-Fuzz:
fuzzing by program transformation,” in Proceedings
of the 39th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(SP), 2018, pp. 697–710.
[8] S. Rawat, V. Jain, A. Kumar, L. Cojocar, C. Giuffrida,
and H. Bos, “VUzzer: Application-aware evolutionary
fuzzing,” in Network and Distributed System Security
(NDSS), 2017.
[9] Google, “OSS-Fuzz - continuous fuzzing for open
source software,” https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz,
2019.
[10] Microsoft, “Microsoft security development lifecy-
cle,” https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/process/
verification.aspx, 2018.
[11] “GitHub,” https://github.com/, 2019.
[12] “DBLP: Computer science bibliography.” https://dblp.
uni-trier.de/, 2019.
[13] G. Klees, A. Ruef, B. Cooper, S. Wei, and M. Hicks,
“Evaluating fuzz testing,” in Proceedings of the 25th
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security (CCS), 2018, pp. 2123–2138.
[14] Y. Li, B. Chen, M. Chandramohan, S.-W. Lin, Y. Liu, and
A. Tiu, “Steelix: program-state based binary fuzzing,” in
Proceedings of the 11th Joint Meeting on Foundations
of Software Engineering. ACM, 2017, pp. 627–637.
[15] X. Zhu, X. Feng, T. Jiao, S. Wen, Y. Xiang, S. Camtepe,
and J. Xue, “A feature-oriented corpus for understanding,
evaluating and improving fuzz testing,” in Proceedings
of the 14th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, 2019, pp. 658–663.
[16] “UNIFUZZ platform,” https://github.com/unifuzz/
overview, 2020.
[17] N. Stephens, J. Grosen, C. Salls, A. Dutcher, R. Wang,
J. Corbetta, Y. Shoshitaishvili, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna,
“Driller: Augmenting fuzzing through selective symbolic
execution.” in Network and Distributed System Security
(NDSS), 2016.
[18] B. Dolan-Gavitt, P. Hulin, E. Kirda, T. Leek, A. Mam-
bretti, W. Robertson, F. Ulrich, and R. Whelan, “LAVA:
Large-scale automated vulnerability addition,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 37th IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP), 2016, pp. 110–121.
[19] “DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge,” https://github.com/
CyberGrandChallenge/, 2018.
[20] “Addresssanitizer,” https://github.com/google/sanitizers/
wiki/AddressSanitizer, 2017.
[21] “GDB: The GNU Project Debugger.” https://www.gnu.
org/software/gdb/, 2019.
[22] S. Ognawala, F. Kilger, and A. Pretschner, “Composi-
tional fuzzing aided by targeted symbolic execution,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.02981, 2019.
[23] P. Chen, J. Liu, and H. Chen, “Matryoshka: fuzzing
deeply nested branches,” in Proceedings of the 26th
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security (CCS), 2019, pp. 499–513.
[24] S. Gan, C. Zhang, X. Qin, X. Tu, K. Li, Z. Pei, and
Z. Chen, “CollAFL: Path sensitive fuzzing,” in Proceed-
ings of the 39th IEEE Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy (SP), 2018, pp. 679–696.
[25] M. Böhme, V.-T. Pham, M.-D. Nguyen, and A. Roy-
choudhury, “Directed greybox fuzzing,” in Proceedings
of the 24th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), 2017, pp. 2329–2344.
[26] “AFLPIN,” https://github.com/mothran/aflpin, 2015.
[27] V.-T. Pham, M. Böhme, A. E. Santosa, A. R. Caciulescu,
and A. Roychoudhury, “Smart greybox fuzzing,” IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, 2019.
[28] H. Han, D. Oh, and S. K. Cha, “CodeAlchemist:
Semantics-aware code generation to find vulnerabili-
ties in javascript engines,” in Network and Distributed
System Security (NDSS), 2019.
[29] I. Fratric, “Domato: A DOM fuzzer,” https://github.com/
googleprojectzero/domato.
[30] “dharma: Generation-based, context-free grammar
fuzzer.” https://github.com/MozillaSecurity/dharma,
2018.
16
[31] J. Choi, J. Jang, C. Han, and S. K. Cha, “Grey-box con-
colic testing on binary code,” in Proceedings of the
41st International Conference on Software Engineer-
ing (ICSE), 2019, pp. 736–747.
[32] C. Lemieux and K. Sen, “FairFuzz: A targeted mutation
strategy for increasing greybox fuzz testing coverage,”
in Proceedings of the 33rd ACM/IEEE International
Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE).
ACM, 2018, pp. 475–485.
[33] “Fuzzilli,” https://github.com/googleprojectzero/fuzzilli,
2019.
[34] R. Hodován, Á. Kiss, and T. Gyimóthy, “Grammarinator:
a grammar-based open source fuzzer,” in Proceedings of
the 9th ACM SIGSOFT International Workshop on Au-
tomating TEST Case Design, Selection, and Evaluation.
ACM, 2018, pp. 45–48.
[35] “Jsfuzz: coverage-guided fuzz testing for javascript,”
https://github.com/fuzzitdev/jsfuzz, 2019.
[36] “jsfunfuzz,” https://github.com/MozillaSecurity/
funfuzz/tree/master/src/funfuzz/js/jsfunfuzz, 2019.
[37] T. Yue, Y. Tang, B. Yu, P. Wang, and E. Wang, “Lear-
nAFL: Greybox fuzzing with knowledge enhancement,”
IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 117 029–117 043, 2019.
[38] L. Hayes, H. Gunadi, A. Herrera, J. Milford, S. Ma-
grath, M. Sebastian, M. Norrish, and A. L. Hosking,
“Moonlight: Effective fuzzing with near-optimal corpus
distillation,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.13055, 2019.
[39] C. Aschermann, T. Frassetto, T. Holz, P. Jauernig, A.-R.
Sadeghi, and D. Teuchert, “Nautilus: Fishing for deep
bugs with grammars.” in Network and Distributed Sys-
tem Security (NDSS), 2019.
[40] D. She, K. Pei, D. Epstein, J. Yang, B. Ray, and S. Jana,
“NEUZZ: Efficient fuzzing with neural program learn-
ing,” in Proceedings of the 40th IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), 2019, pp. 803–817.
[41] T. Petsios, A. Tang, S. Stolfo, A. D. Keromytis, and
S. Jana, “NEZHA: Efficient domain-independent differ-
ential testing,” in Proceedings of the 38th IEEE Sympo-
sium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2017, pp. 615–632.
[42] B. Shastry, M. Leutner, T. Fiebig, K. Thimmaraju, F. Ya-
maguchi, K. Rieck, S. Schmid, J.-P. Seifert, and A. Feld-
mann, “Static program analysis as a fuzzing aid,” in
International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intru-
sions, and Defenses. Springer, 2017, pp. 26–47.
[43] “Peach fuzzer,” https://www.peach.tech, 2018.
[44] G. Zhang, X. Zhou, Y. Luo, X. Wu, and E. Min, “PTfuzz:
Guided Fuzzing With Processor Trace Feedback,” IEEE
Access, vol. 6, pp. 37 302–37 313, 2018.
[45] G. Grieco, M. Ceresa, and P. Buiras, “QuickFuzz: An
automatic random fuzzer for common file formats,” in
ACM SIGPLAN Notices, vol. 51, no. 12. ACM, 2016,
pp. 13–20.
[46] “radamsa: a general-purpose fuzzer,” https://gitlab.com/
akihe/radamsa, 2018.
[47] T. Petsios, J. Zhao, A. D. Keromytis, and S. Jana, “Slow-
Fuzz: Automated domain-independent detection of al-
gorithmic complexity vulnerabilities,” in Proceedings
of the 24th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), 2017, pp. 2155–2168.
[48] J. Wang, B. Chen, L. Wei, and Y. Liu, “Superion:
grammar-aware greybox fuzzing,” in Proceedings of the
41st International Conference on Software Engineering
(ICSE). IEEE, 2019, pp. 724–735.
[49] C. Labs, “zzuf - multi-purpose fuzzer,” http://caca.zoy.
org/wiki/zzuf/, 2017.
[50] S. K. Lahiri, R. Sinha, and C. Hawblitzel, “Automatic
rootcausing for program equivalence failures in bina-
ries,” in International Conference on Computer Aided
Verification. Springer, 2015, pp. 362–379.
[51] H. D. T. Nguyen, D. Qi, A. Roychoudhury, and S. Chan-
dra, “Semfix: Program repair via semantic analysis,” in
Proceedings of the 35th International Conference on
Software Engineering (ICSE). IEEE, 2013, pp. 772–
781.
[52] D. Molnar, X. C. Li, and D. A. Wagner, “Dynamic test
generation to find integer bugs in x86 binary linux pro-
grams.” in Proceedings of the 18th USENIX Security
Symposium, vol. 9, 2009, pp. 67–82.
[53] NVD, “CVE: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures,”
https://cve.mitre.org/, 2018.
[54] D. Mu, A. Cuevas, L. Yang, H. Hu, X. Xing, B. Mao, and
G. Wang, “Understanding the reproducibility of crowd-
reported security vulnerabilities,” in Proceedings of the
27th USENIX Security Symposium, 2018, pp. 919–936.
[55] https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=
overlap.
[56] “Flawfinder,” https://dwheeler.com/flawfinder/.
[57] “Rough auditing tool for security
(rats),” https://code.google.com/archive/p/
rough-auditing-tool-for-security/.
17
[58] “Clang static analyzer,” https://clang-analyzer.llvm.org/.
[59] A. Vargha and H. D. Delaney, “A critique and improve-
ment of the CL common language effect size statistics
of McGraw and Wong,” Journal of Educational and
Behavioral Statistics, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 101–132, 2000.
[60] R. Nuzzo, “Scientific method: statistical errors,” Nature
News, vol. 506, no. 7487, p. 150, 2014.
[61] R. L. Wasserstein, A. L. Schirm, and N. A. Lazar, “Mov-
ing to a world beyond “p< 0.05”,” pp. 1–19, 2019.
[62] “scipy.stats.mannwhitneyu,” https://docs.scipy.org/doc/
scipy/reference/generated/scipy.stats.mannwhitneyu.
html, 2019.
[63] “The exploitable GDB plugin.” https://github.com/
jfoote/exploitable, 2018.
[64] “Common Vulnerability Scoring System SIG,” https:
//www.first.org/cvss/, 2019.
[65] “SanitizerCoverage: Clang documentation,” https://
clang.llvm.org/docs/SanitizerCoverage.html, 2018.
[66] “afl-cov: AFL Fuzzing Code Coverage,” https://github.
com/mrash/afl-cov, 2018.
[67] Y. Shoshitaishvili, R. Wang, C. Salls, N. Stephens,
M. Polino, A. Dutcher, J. Grosen, S. Feng, C. Hauser,
C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna, “SoK: (State of) The Art of
War: Offensive Techniques in Binary Analysis,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 37th IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP), 2016, pp. 138–157.
[68] C.-K. Luk, R. Cohn, R. Muth, H. Patil, A. Klauser,
G. Lowney, S. Wallace, V. J. Reddi, and K. Hazelwood,
“Pin: building customized program analysis tools with
dynamic instrumentation,” in ACM SIGPLAN Notices,
vol. 40, no. 6. ACM, 2005, pp. 190–200.
[69] https://www.exploit-db.com/, 2020.
[70] “CVE details,” https://www.cvedetails.com/, 2019.
[71] “Securityfocus,” https://www.securityfocus.com/
vulnerabilities.
[72] “Securitytracker,” https://securitytracker.com/.
18
